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Abstract
Purpose:  This  paper  aims  at  examining  the  quality  of  corporate  disclosure  about
goodwill  impairment  and  its  relationship  with  goodwill  write-offs  and  earnings
performance,  exploiting  an  accounting  regulation  that  allows  significant  unverifiable
estimates whilst requires a high level of information.
Design/methodology/approach: This study, based on a sample of Italian and British
firms with market indications of goodwill impairment, verifies through a both univariate
and multivariate analysis whether the level  of disclosure is  positively related to the
magnitude of goodwill write-off and to earnings performance, using a self-constructed
score of mandatory disclosure about goodwill impairment tests in accordance with IAS
36 requirements.
Findings: In a general context of insufficient information, we find that for Italian firms
both the magnitude of goodwill write-offs and earnings performance are significantly
and  positively  associated  to  the  level  of  mandatory  disclosure  about  goodwill
impairment tests. For the British firms, as companies more used to impairment test
rules, the data does not confirm any significant association.
Research limitations/implications:  The objective of this study is to test the initial
impact  of  IAS  36  in  the  first  years  of  its  application,  selecting  a  sample  of  firms
belonging  to  limited  but  significant  activity  sectors.  Future  research  could  usefully
analyse a wider sample of firms, also extending the time period of analysis. In any
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case, the findings of our study are consistent with the insights of earnings management
theory, suggesting that the subjectivity inherent in impairment test assumptions could
be used opportunistically by managers.
Originality/value: This  research  investigates  questions  still  relatively  unexplored,
concerning the effects of goodwill write-offs and accounting performance on corporate
disclosure about goodwill impairment test. Based on this analysis, the study shows that
corporate disclosure could be a “litmus paper” able to test the degree of good faith with
which each firm has implemented IAS 36 requirements.
Keywords: Disclosure, Goodwill Write-offs, Accounting Performance, Corporate Governance, 
Earnings Management
Jel Codes: M41, M48
Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on the importance of goodwill accounting. The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) has sought to improve the relevance of this issue by moving towards
goodwill impairment rules with SFAS 142 – Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (FASB, 2001).
Similarly,  IAS  36  –  Impairment  of  Assets  (IASB,  2004)  eliminates  goodwill  amortization,
requiring instead that goodwill be evaluated at least annually for possible impairment. 
The shift from amortization to periodic reviews puts a new and continuous responsibility on
business managers to determine the recoverable amount of goodwill and a new burden on
auditors, regulators and investors to evaluate management determination (Hayn  & Hughes,
2006).
In the light of IAS 36 requirements, as well known, an impairment test is based on a chain of
significant assumptions, with reference, for instance, to cash generating units identification,
discount  rates estimate,  growth rates  appraisal.  Such a degree of  allowable  discretion,  as
earnings management theory predicts, could be used opportunistically by managers (Watts,
2003; Quagli & Meini, 2007). On the other hand, the level of impairment disclosure required by
IAS 36 is considerably high, regardless of whether goodwill write-offs are recorded or not.
In  the  general  context  of  IAS  introduction,  it  is  well  documented  that  companies  do  not
necessarily comply with accounting standards mandatory disclosure (Tsalavoutas, 2011), as
the existence of legislation and enforcing bodies does not guarantee compliance (Yeoh, 2005)
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and, even when disclosures are mandatory, firms still have some flexibility in the way they
report the information (Chavent, Ding, Fu, Stolowy & Wang, 2006; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). As a
consequence, our analysis aims at measuring compliance with IAS 36 mandatory disclosure
during the first years of its implementation, determining a significant change in the accounting
treatment of goodwill.
Particularly,  using  a  sample  of  Italian  and  British  listed  firms  with  market  indications  of
goodwill impairment, this paper examines whether the quality of disclosure about a goodwill
impairment test is related to the magnitude of goodwill write-off.
We consider both Italian and British consolidated financial statements for the period 2006 –
2008, in order to check the initial impact of IAS 36 application for countries with a significantly
different accounting tradition. OIC 24 – Intangible Assets (OIC, 2005) requires the systematic
amortization of goodwill, while under FRS 10 – Goodwill and Intangible Assets (ASB, 1997)
goodwill should be amortised only if it is regarded as having a limited useful life, otherwise it
should  not  be  amortised  but  reviewed  for  impairment  at  each  period-end,  providing  an
adequate disclosure in the notes to the accounts.
In a context of relevant unverifiable estimates which can seriously increase the likelihood of
opportunistic  behaviour,  we assume that  impairment  disclosure could  represent  a relevant
indicator  of  the  degree  of  good  faith  with  which  management  has  implemented  IAS  36
requirements on a goodwill impairment test. Accordingly, we test the positive relation between
disclosure quality and magnitude of goodwill write-offs.
A  separate  but  related  issue  is  whether  the  level  of  disclosure  is  related  to  earnings
performance. A few prior studies provide evidence of a positive relation between the general
level of corporate disclosure and accounting performance indicators. Hence, we also test the
positive association between the quality of specific disclosure about goodwill impairment and
accounting performance of the firm.
Our analysis also allows to check the impact of the quality of corporate governance on the
degree of corporate disclosure, by including specific variables connected with the composition
of the board of directors and the activity of the audit committee, which should monitor the
integrity of the financial statements of the company (Financial Reporting Council, 2006; Borsa
Italiana, 2006).
This paper contributes to the existing research in several ways. Firstly it provides empirical
evidence  on  the  magnitude  of  goodwill  write-offs,  company  profitability,  the  level  of
impairment disclosure and the quality of corporate governance with reference to a sample of
firms of two countries with very different cultural contexts and accounting traditions. Secondly,
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it focuses on a question still relatively unexplored, finding a significant and positive relation
between disclosure quality  and goodwill  write-offs.  Thirdly,  it  studies the relation  between
corporate disclosure and earnings performance in a new context, that of goodwill accounting,
providing  evidence  of  the  effects  of  accounting  performance  on  the  degree  of  corporate
disclosure inherent in goodwill impairment tests.
This paper is organised as follows.
The next section provides background on related research. Section 3 develops the hypotheses
for the study. Section 4 describes our sample selection and research design. In Section 5 the
empirical results are shown. Section 6 discusses the results. In Section 7 additional analyses
and robustness test are conducted. The final section draws conclusions.
Previous Research
There  is  a  long  stream  of  research  that  examines  relevant  issues  related  to  goodwill
accounting; in addition, the adoption of SFAS 142 and IFRS 36 has encouraged new studies on
write-offs.  Looking  at  the  literature  related  to  impairment  of  goodwill,  there  are  three
fundamental lines of research.
The first  analyses the determinants  of  goodwill  write-offs,  in  order  to  verify  if  managers,
according to agency theory prediction, use discretion in accounting standards to manage their
earnings opportunistically. Especially, these studies test if non-impairment decision increases in
economic or financial characteristics that serve as proxies for greater unverifiable fair value
based discretion.
The second related literature seeks to provide evidence on association between goodwill write-
offs, equity market values and stock returns. A subset of this literature examines the ability to
predict goodwill impairment on the basis of accounting or financial performance ratios.
The  third  line  of  research,  in  some  ways  still  relatively  unexplored,  aims  to  analyse  the
determinants of  disclosure quality about goodwill  impairment test.  However, most of these
studies only provide descriptive statistics about the content of corporate disclosure.   
Overall,  it  should  be  added  that  the  issues  relating  to  these  research  areas  are  treated
together in many works, as described below. 
Beatty and Weber (2006) examine the factors affecting the decision to take an SFAS 142
write-off  and the percentage of  the goodwill  that is  actually  written-off.  With reference to
previous studies  (Watts  & Zimmerman,  1990;  Francis,  Hanna  & Vincent,  1996),  they find
empirical  evidence  that  firms’  debt  contracting,  bonus,  turnover  and  exchange  delisting
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incentives affect managers’ decisions to accelerate or delay expense recognition. In particular,
they argue that managers with longer tenures are more likely to have been involved in the
acquisitions that generated that goodwill. The data confirms that, to avoid reputation costs,
such long-tenure managers are less likely to take goodwill write-offs.
Ramanna  (2008)  studies  the  evolution  of  SFAS  142,  which  uses  unverifiable  fair-value
estimates to account for acquired goodwill, in order to test what is argued in previous research
(Holthausen  & Watts, 2001; Watts, 2003; Roychowdhury  & Watts, 2007). He assumes that
FASB issues SFAS 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling
accounting, and the results are consistent with SFAS 142 impairment tests being due in part to
firms opposed to abolishing pooling.
Another study of the same author, together with Watts (Ramanna & Watts, 2012), finds a low
frequency of goodwill write-offs in a sample of American firms with strong market indications
of goodwill impairment (firms with book goodwill and two successive years of book to market
ratios above one). The data does not confirm that the decision of avoiding impairment is due
to management’s possession of favourable private information. On the contrary, the authors
find  evidence  that  non-impairment  is  associated  with  agency-based  motives:  goodwill
impairments decrease in CEO reputation and debt-covenant violation concerns. However, the
results  don’t  confirm  a  significant  association  between  goodwill  write-offs  and  firm
capitalisation ratios.
Ahmed and Guler (2007) focus on the relationship between impairment  of  goodwill,  stock
returns and stock prices. In particular, contrary to Ramanna  and Watts (2012), they find a
significant negative association between goodwill write-offs and stock returns in the post SFAS
142 period. Furthermore, they find evidence that such association is higher for firms that have
a high number of segments, suggesting that goodwill numbers are more reliable for firms with
a high number of segments relative to firms with a low number of segments. 
Bens, Heltzer and Segal (2007) document a negative and significant stock market reaction to
unexpected goodwill write-offs. In particular, they find evidence that the market reaction is
attenuated for firms with low information asymmetry, suggesting that the market impounds
this information into price for these firms prior to the public announcement by the company. In
contrast with Ahmed and Guler (2007), the authors find no variation in market based on the
complexity of the firm’s structure (their proxy is the number of reported segments): however,
in  this  study the sample is  restricted to the firms with  magnitude of  goodwill  impairment
higher than 5% of total assets.
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Hayn  and  Hughes  (2006)  find  that  the  ability  to  predict  goodwill  impairment  based  on
performance indicators and information provided in the financial statements is limited. This is
also due to the fact that these are general indicators that pertain primarily to the firm as a
whole rather than to a particular segment or reporting unit to which goodwill shall, from the
acquisition date, be allocated. Indeed, certain characteristics of acquired companies such as
the premium paid in the acquisition, the percentage of the purchase price assigned to goodwill
and the use of stock as the primary mode of consideration, appear to contribute more to the
prediction of goodwill write-offs than available disclosures on the acquired entity in the years
subsequent to the acquisition.
With regard to impairment disclosure, Paananen (2008), using a random sample of companies
from France,  Germany and  the United Kingdom,  examines  the  comparability  of  fair  value
accounting  of  goodwill  under  IFRS.  The data confirms,  as  expected,  that  large companies
operating in United Kingdom, which is considered an environment with a relatively higher level
of investor protection, are more likely to provide more disclosure on a goodwill impairment
test. However, the author recognizes that the results should be interpreted cautiously since the
study has inherent limitation of a small sample size and a simplistic method is used to measure
disclosure levels among the sampled companies.
The  study  of  Verriest  and  Gaeremynck  (2009)  investigates  the  determinants  of  goodwill
impairment  decisions,  finding  empirical  evidence  that  companies  with  stronger  corporate
governance mechanism and also firms exhibiting better accounting and market performance
are more likely to impair. The authors, according to Francis  et al. (1996), argue that better
performing firms are more likely to engage in goodwill impairment as the signal they send out
to investors of a lower profitability is weaker and of lower importance, provided that these
firms are financially healthy.
In  the  same  study  Verriest  and  Gaeremynck  (2009)  also  examine  the  determinants  of
disclosure quality on goodwill  impairment. However, they find that ownership structure and
corporate governance quality have a weak impact on the degree of impairment disclosure. In
addition,  the  data  doesn’t  confirm  the  expected  positive  association  between  accounting
performance indicators and the level of impairment disclosure.
There is also a more extensive research on the influence of earnings performance or earnings
quality on the general level of mandatory or voluntary corporate disclosure, that is, disclosure
not specifically  inherent  in  goodwill  impairment  tests.  In any case,  some of  these studies
provide evidence of an increase in all types of disclosures during periods of increased earnings
(Miller, 2002) and find that voluntary disclosure and earnings quality are positively related
(Francis,  Nanda  & Olsson,  2008).  In a broader context,  other works  investigate  how firm
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disclosure activity affects the relation between current annual stock returns, contemporaneous
annual earnings and future earnings (Lundholm  & Myers, 2002) and examine the effect of
voluntary disclosure on the use of discretionary accruals to smooth earnings and on the value
relevance of earnings (Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier, Magnan & Gay-Angers, 2006). 
 Hypothesis Development
The results of studies of goodwill write-offs determinants are generally mixed. Prior research
does not find strong evidence on identifying specific factors able to have significant predictive
ability  for goodwill  impairments. Indeed, analytical  research provides conflicting predictions
about how stock returns or accounting performance influence the magnitude of goodwill write-
offs.
This seems primarily  due to the fact  that the key indicators treated by most of  literature
pertain to the firm as a whole rather than to the specific cash generating unit to which each
goodwill shall be allocated.
On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  noted  that  IAS  36  impairment  tests  allow  significant
unverifiable estimates which can seriously increase the likelihood of opportunistic disclosures.
In estimating the recoverable amount of goodwill, management assesses the reasonableness
of the assumption on which its current cash flow projections are based, with reference, for
instance,  to  cash  generating  units  identification,  discount  rates  estimate,  growth  rates
appraisal. In this context, managers could exploit the high degree of discretion in order to
manage earnings,  in  line  with  the insights  of  earnings management  theory  (Watts,  2003;
Quagli & Meini, 2007).
Relating to this issue, a few prior studies find evidence that non-impairment is associated with
agency-based  motives  and  is  increasing  in  financial  characteristics,  as  number  or  size  of
reporting units and unverifiable net assets in reporting units, that serve as proxies for greater
unverifiable fair value discretion. 
However, the level of impairment disclosure required by IAS 36 is considerably high, regardless
of whether goodwill write-offs are recorded or not. Firms have to provide detailed information
in  the  notes  to  the financial  statements  on any  significant  assumption used to  determine
goodwill fair value or value in use. 
Hence,  disclosure  requirements  seem to  act  as  a  significant  counterweight  to  the several
profiles of subjectivity inherent in impairment test assumptions. On the other hand, a low level
of disclosure provided by the firm could reveal earnings management. 
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Prior  research  generally  has  not  looked at  the  association  between disclosure  quality  and
magnitude of goodwill write-offs. This study will address this issue, in order to investigate the
existence  of  an  interrelation  between  mandatory  disclosure  in  accordance  with  IAS  36,
recording of goodwill impairments and earnings performance. 
In a sample of Italian and British listed firms with market indications of goodwill impairment,
we firstly assume a lower level of disclosure provided by the firm in case of non-impairment.
Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive relation between disclosure quality and magnitude of
goodwill write-offs.
Hypothesis 1 (H1):
“The level  of  impairment  disclosure  provided by  firms with  market  indications  of  goodwill
impairment is positively associated to the magnitude of goodwill write-offs”.
Our second hypothesis, consistent with the group of studies that provide evidence on positive
relation  between  the  general  level  of  corporate  disclosure  and  accounting  performance
indicators, is the following.
Hypothesis 2 (H2):
“The level  of  impairment  disclosure  provided by  firms with  market  indications  of  goodwill
impairment is positively associated to earnings performance”.
However,  as  discussed  earlier,  it  should  be  noted  that  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom are
countries  with very different cultural  contexts and accounting traditions. In particular,  only
British  firms  have  applied  goodwill  impairment  tests  before  IAS  36  effective  date,  in
accordance with FRS 10 requirements. As a result, we suppose that disclosure provided by
British firms, as company more used to impairment test rules, is less influenced by goodwill
write-offs and accounting performance.
Hypothesis 3 (H3):
 “The association between impairment disclosure and goodwill write-offs and the association
between  impairment  disclosure  and  accounting  performance  are  higher  for  Italian  firms
compared to British firms”.
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Research Design
Sample Selection
As noted in the literature review, the sample selection criteria adopted in previous related
studies are not the same.
For instance, Bens  et al. (2007) select firms with magnitude of goodwill impairment higher
than 5% of total assets, Ramanna and Watts (2012) analyse only firms with two successive
years of book to market ratios above one, Beatty and Weber (2006) restrict the sample to
firms with a difference between the market and the book value of their equity that is less than
their recorded goodwill, Paananen (2008) randomly selects firms with a positive gross value of
goodwill.
In  summary,  most  of  the  previous  studies  identify  selection  criteria,  albeit  variously
configurable, in order to select firms with indication of likely goodwill impairment.
Similarly,  in  our  research we analyse  only  firms that  are  expected to  engage  in  goodwill
impairment. We do this by investigating whether the firm market to book value (calculated
before the effect of any goodwill  impairment) is  smaller than one or under the median of
market to book value. The median of market to book value is calculated for each observation
year and for each country.
The data used in the empirical tests is drawn from the consolidated financial statements of
Italian and British sampled companies for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. We choose this time
period in order to investigate the initial impact of IAS 36 in the first years of its application:
however, we exclude the year  2005 as the data  could be influenced by the extraordinary
effects caused by the transition to the different treatment of goodwill.
As discussed earlier,  we consider both Italian and British companies in order to check the
impact of  IAS 36 application for  countries with significantly different  accounting traditions.
Specifically, we choose, on the one hand, a country whose national accounting standard on
intangible assets (the Italian OIC 24) is founded on the systematic amortization of goodwill,
and, on the other hand, a country whose corresponding accounting standard (the British FRS
10) is based on the impairment test.
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The sample selection criteria are detailed in Table 1.
Italian
companies
British
companies Total
First number of companies of 
selected sectors 42 39 81
First number of sampled 
consolidated financial 
statements 2006 – 2008
126 117 243
Less:
Financial statements with zero 
goodwill value - 14 - 17 - 31
Financial statements with 
market to book value both > 
median and > 1
- 52 - 48 - 100
Financial statements with 
negative book value of equity - 1 - 1 - 2
Final sample 59 51 110
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure
We firstly selected all Italian and British consolidated financial statements of companies: 
• continuously listed from 2005 until 2008 in the stock market of their own country of
origin (and not listed at the same time in the United States stock market);
• not reporting under IAS/IFRS before year 2005.
Then, we calculated for each activity sector the standard deviation of the number of firms
belonging respectively to Italy and United Kingdom and we selected the sectors with  own
standard deviation equal to the median value. This in order to analyse the representative areas
of the typical difference in terms of number of companies between the two countries. As a
result, we identified the next five sectors with the same standard deviation (equal to 2.12):
• “Software and Computer Services”;
• “Electronic and Electrical Equipment”;
• “Automobiles and Parts”;
• “Construction and Materials”;
• “Household Goods and Home Construction”.
It should be added, in order to evaluate the significance of the selected sectors, that they play
a great importance within the gross domestic product in both countries, and concern both “old
economy” and “new economy” areas. A significant number of large companies, listed on their
respective  stock  markets,  belong  to  these  sectors,  which  are  characterized  by  high
interrelations among themselves and with other important sectors of national and international
economy. Moreover,  these areas are not affected by very high fluctuations  in  prices,  and,
finally, the selected sectors are not characterized by forms of monopolistic or monopsonistic
market, but at mostly by oligopolistic configurations close to imperfect competition.
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The first number of sampled consolidated financial statements, referred to the years from 2006
to 2008, is  243; applying the selection  criteria  described in Table 1,  we identify  the final
sample of 110 cases. This seems to be a justified reduction of the sample, having regard to the
aim of this research. In addition, the final number of observations is aligned to the sample
identifying in previous related studies, for instance the research of Ramanna and Watts (2012),
reported to 124 observations, and the paper of Verriest and Gaeremynck (2009), focused on
47 statements.
We made a direct reading of each consolidated financial statements, without the use of any
database, also in order to analyse the quality of disclosure about the goodwill impairment test
reported in the notes to the accounts.
Empirical Models
In order to find evidence of our research hypotheses, we firstly develop a disclosure model
concerning a goodwill impairment test. Disclosure is defined here as consisting of mandatory
items  of  information  provided  in  the  notes  to  the  consolidated  financial  statements  in
accordance with the requirements of IAS 36.
Table 2 describes ten items identified to measure corporate quality disclosure: the approach to
scoring items is dichotomous in that an item scores one if disclosed and zero otherwise.
Score Requirement
1 Identification of each cash generating unit (CGU) over which goodwill is allocated
1 Goodwill allocation to CGUs
1 No changes in CGUs identification or in goodwill allocation to CGUs since the previous year
1 Information on the numbers of years covered by the budgets
1 Information on the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the periodcovered by the budgets
1 Information on the numbers of years over which management has projected cash flow basedon financial budgets
1 Information on the discount rates applied to the cash flow projections
1 Differentiation of the discount rates applied to each CGUs
1 Recourse to external sources of information or appraisal to verify the assumptions on whichmanagement has founded its impairment test
1 Sensitivity analysis for the units’ recoverable amount
0 Minimum score
10 Maximum score
Table 2. Disclosure Score
Hence the maximum a company could achieve is 10 and the minimum zero.
The dichotomous method gives equal weight to the individual items required to be disclosed by
the standard (Cooke,  1989;  Cooke,  1992; Hossain,  Tan  & Adams,  1994)  and therefore  it
enables  to  reduce  the  degree  of  subjectivity  in  the  evaluation  of  mandatory  information
provided by each firm (Tsalavoutas, Evans & Smith, 2010).
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The number of items is limited, but it results from the scope of our study, which concentrates
on a  single  topic,  that  is  disclosure regarding  goodwill  impairment  tests.  In  addition,  our
number  of  requirements  is  aligned  to  the  number  of  items  identifying  in  some  previous
disclosure studies, for instance 11 items (Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok & Lau, 1990), 9 items (Prencipe,
2004), 14 items (Chavent et al., 2006), 6 items (Deumes & Knechel, 2008), 12 items (Greco,
2010).
In  short,  our  items  refer  to  information  about  cash  generating  units,  identification  and
allocation of goodwill, as well as each key assumption used by management to measure units’
recoverable amount, including information on recourse to external source of information and
sensitivity analysis.
All  the  sampled  firms  have  applied  the  “value  in  use”  method  in  order  to  evaluate  the
recoverable amount of own goodwill.
Variable Definition
DISC Score disclosure (from 0 to 10) concerning goodwill impairment test (see table 2)
IMP / AST Goodwill impairment scaled by total assets (calculated before the effect of goodwillimpairment)
IMP / EQT Goodwill  impairment  scaled  by  equity  (calculated  before  the  effect  of  goodwillimpairment)
IMP / GDW Goodwill  impairment  scaled  by  goodwill  (calculated  before  the  effect  of  goodwillimpairment)
ROE Profit (loss) for year (calculated before the effect of goodwill impairment) scaled byequity (calculated before the effect of goodwill impairment)
AVG.ROE Average ROE in the period 2005 – 2008
A.C. MEET. Number of meetings of the audit committee held in year
A.C.IND.DIR. Number of independent directors members of the audit  committee scaled by totalnumber of directors
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
YEAR.06 Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the year 2006
YEAR.07 Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the year 2007
YEAR.08 Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the year 2008
SECT.A Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the sector A “Software and ComputerServices”
SECT.B Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the sector B “Electronic and ElectricalEquipment”
SECT.C Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the sector C “Automobiles and Parts”
SECT.D Dummy variable  set  to  one if  the  case concerns  the  sector  D “Construction  andMaterials”
SECT.E Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns the sector E “Household Goods andHome Construction”
COUNTRY Dummy variable set to one if the case concerns Italian companies
Table 3. Variable Definitions
Table 3 includes the definitions of all variables used in this study, which apply to disclosure
level  (DISC),  goodwill  write-offs,  alternative  ratios  of  company  profitability,  corporate
governance variables and firm size. Most of the control variables have been commonly used in
prior disclosure research studies (Cooke, 1991; Forker, 1992; Hossain, Tan  & Adams, 1994;
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Wallace, Naser & Mora, 1994; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Eng & Mak, 2003;
Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007).
In particular:
• to ensure the robustness of the results, three different scalars are used in order to
measure the goodwill impairment loss – total assets (IMP / AST), equity (IMP / EQT)
and goodwill (IMP / GDW) – all calculated at financial year-end before the effect of any
goodwill impairment;
• the  return  on  equity  ratio  (ROE),  measured  at  financial  year-end,  represents  the
company profitability in the period;
• the company profitability is also measured by the average value of return on equity
ratio (AVG.ROE), calculated with reference to the period from 2005 to 2008;
• the corporate governance related variables are represented by the number of meetings
of  the  audit  committee  held  in  year  (A.C.MEET.)  and  the  number  of  independent
directors  members  of  the  audit  committee  scaled  by  total  number  of  directors
(A.C.IND.DIR.);
• the firm size is given in the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE).
The dummy variables refer to each year (from YEAR.06 to YEAR.08) and each sector (from
SECT.A to SECT.E) considered in this study.
Consequently, we firstly examine a series of descriptive statistics arising from the financial
statements reviewed, using appropriate tests of significance in order to obtain early feedback
to our assumptions.
Subsequently, correlation analysis will be done through the construction of Pearson correlation
matrices, checking positive correlations between corporate disclosure and goodwill impairment
as well as earnings performance.
Finally, we test the fundamental assumptions with a multivariate analysis, using a series of
multiple linear regressions that are introduced below. 
Multiple linear regression – Model 1:
DISC = a + b1IMP/AST + b2ROE + b3A.C.MEET. + b4A.C.IND.DIR. + b5SIZE + b6YEAR.07 +
b7YEAR.08 + b8SECT.A + b9SECT.B + b10SETC.C + b11SECT.D + b12COUNTRY + e
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Multiple linear regression – Model 2:
DISC = a + b1IMP/EQT + b2ROE + b3A.C.MEET. + b4A.C.IND.DIR. + b5SIZE + b6YEAR.07 +
b7YEAR.08 + b8SECT.A + b9SECT.B + b10SETC.C + b11SECT.D + b12COUNTRY + e
Multiple linear regression – Model 3:
DISC = a + b1IMP/GDW + b2ROE + b3A.C.MEET. + b4A.C.IND.DIR. + b5SIZE + b6YEAR.07 +
b7YEAR.08 + b8SECT.A + b9SECT.B + b10SETC.C + b11SECT.D + b12COUNTRY + e
Multiple linear regression – Model 4:
DISC = a + b1IMP/AST + b2AVG.ROE + b3A.C.MEET. + b4A.C.IND.DIR. + b5SIZE + b6YEAR.07
+ b7YEAR.08 + b8SECT.A + b9SECT.B + b10SETC.C + b11SECT.D + b12COUNTRY + e
Multiple linear regression – Model 5:
DISC = a + b1IMP/EQT + b2AVG.ROE + b3A.C.MEET. + b4A.C.IND.DIR. + b5SIZE + b6YEAR.07
+ b7YEAR.08 + b8SECT.A + b9SECT.B + b10SETC.C + b11SECT.D + b12COUNTRY + e
Multiple linear regression – Model 6:
DISC = a + b1IMP/GDW + b2AVG.ROE + b3A.C.MEET. + b4A.C.IND.DIR. + b5SIZE + b6YEAR.07
+ b7YEAR.08 + b8SECT.A + b9SECT.B + b10SETC.C + b11SECT.D + b12COUNTRY + e
The level of disclosure is the dependent variable regression of the six functions above, which
differ in the choice of independent variables likely to express the extent of impairment of
goodwill and the corporate profitability. 
We will indicate below the results of further regressions, calculated after carrying alternatives
substitutions of dummy variables not yet included to assure the accuracy of the issues, namely
the dummy variable for the year 2006 (YEAR.06) and the dummy variable for the sector E
(SECT.E).
Goodwill impairment is scaled to total assets in Model 1 and Model 4, equity in Model 2 and
Model 5, goodwill in Model 3 and Model 6. In Models 1, 2 and 3 the economic performance is
represented by the return on equity of the correspondent year, whilst in Models 4, 5 and 6 ROE
it is calculated as an average value for the whole period from 2005 until 2008.
The coefficient on goodwill impairment (b1) and the coefficient on corporate profitability (b2)
are expected to be positive (see, respectively, H1 and H2) and greater (see H3) with respect to
the Italian cases.
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Furthermore, it is expected that the coefficient on size (b5) is positive, since usually the costs
of disclosure decrease with increasing firm size (Hossain, Perera & Rahman, 1995).
Concerning the issue  of  corporate  governance,  with  regard  to  the scope  of  our  study we
selected a variable related to the level of activity of the audit committee, as its role and its
responsibility  include  monitoring  the  integrity  of  the  financial  statements  of  the  company
(Sierra Garcia, Ruiz Barbadillo  & Orta Perez, 2012). A few previous studies provide empirical
evidence of the positive association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the number
of meetings held by the audit committee (Menon  & Williams, 1994; Karamanou  & Vafeas,
2005; Greco, 2010), so we predict a positive sign of the corresponding coefficient (b3).
In  a  broader  context,  with  reference  to  the association  between  disclosure and  corporate
governance variables, the findings emerging from prior related research are not the same.
In fact empirical  studies, mainly in the context of  voluntary disclosure, show controversial
results, in particular regarding the impact of independent directors.
Some  works  noted  that  the  proportion  of  independent  directors  affects  the  quality  of
mandatory disclosure (Chen & Jaggi, 2000) while other analyses found no association between
the two variables (Forker, 1992). A recent line of research only considers “qualified” classes of
independent  directors,  for  instance  represented  by  those  directors  defined  as  community
influential board members (Michelon  & Parbonetti, 2012), showing positive associations with
the level of voluntary disclosure.  
Hence, we similarly consider in our analysis just the independent directors with an “active
role”,  identified  by  membership  of  the  audit  committee,  assuming  a  positive  sign  of  the
corresponding coefficient (b4).
Finally, we expect the level of disclosure to be significantly affected by the year as well as the
sector (Cooke, 1992). With regard to variables related to years 2006 to 2008, it is assumed
that  the  intensity  of  association  to  the  level  of  disclosure  is  chronologically  increasing,
indicating a positive trend of progressive assimilation, especially for Italian companies, of the
innovative provisions of IAS 36.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
As noted earlier, there are 110 observations meeting our sample criteria. Of these, as shown in
Table 4, only 25% record goodwill impairment. Given our sample-selection criteria (market to
book value below one or below median), the relatively low frequency of impairment suggests
that IAS 36 is not so effective in generating timely write-offs.
Italian cases British cases Total
n % n % n %
No goodwill impairment 46 78% 37 73% 83 75%
Goodwill impairment 13 22% 14 27% 27 25%
Total 59 100% 51 100% 110 100%
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.510
Table 4. Frequency of Goodwill Impairments
The frequency of goodwill non-impairment in the Italian sample (59 cases) is 78%, while in the
British sample (51 cases) the frequency is 73%. The chi-square statistic for the comparison of
impairment frequency across firm country is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.510).
Table 5 presents some descriptive statistics for all the variables, with reference to the Italian
and British companies.
In Panel 5A we report on the results among sampled Italian cases, equal to 59. The mean
value of disclosure score is 5.5, with an oscillation between the minimum possible score (equal
to 0) to the maximum possible score (equal to 10). 
The average  amount  of  goodwill  write-offs,  in  terms of  total  assets,  is  0.2%,  reaching  a
maximum value of 9%. In relation to equity, the mean value of goodwill impairment is 1.3%
and records very high peaks, at 66.7% of equity. Moreover, the mean value of goodwill write-
offs related to book value of goodwill is 0.6%, with a relevant maximum value equal to 14.9%.
 Subsequent Panel 5B reproduces the same descriptive statistics for the British cases, equal to
51. The mean value of disclosure score is 5.0; the corresponding median value is equal to 5
and the maximum score reaches 8.
The  average  amount  of  goodwill  impairment,  scaled by  total  assets,  is  0.9%,  reaching  a
maximum value of 14.4%. In terms of equity, the mean value of goodwill impairment is 1.8%,
with a maximum value equal to 26%. Moreover, the median value of goodwill write-offs related
to book value of goodwill is 7.0%: it is noticeable that the maximum value is 100%.
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Panel 5A: Italian Companies
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standarddeviation
DISC 5.475 6.000 0.000 10.000 2.615
IMP / AST 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.012
IMP / EQT 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.087
IMP / GDW 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.022
ROE 0.059 0.070 - 0.430 0.260 0.115
AVG.ROE - 0.033 0.071 - 5.274 0.208 0.700
A.C.MEET. 3.373 3.000 0.000 10.000 2.399
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.221 0.222 0.000 0.429 0.118
SIZE 13.427 12.990 10.837 16.323 1.578
n = 59
Panel 5B: British Companies
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standarddeviation
DISC 4.980 5.000 0.000 8.000 2.549
IMP / AST 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.144 0.030
IMP / EQT 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.056
IMP / GDW 0.070 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.211
ROE 0.091 0.099 - 0.181 0.472 0.107
AVG.ROE 0.163 0.109 - 0.500 1.063 0.270
A.C.MEET. 3.647 4.000 2.000 6.000 1.146
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.406 0.400 0.200 0.625 0.101
SIZE 12.716 12.948 8.645 15.550 1.764
n = 51
Panel 5C: Italian and British Companies
Variable Italian cases(n = 59)
British cases
(n = 51)
Difference in
mean value t-statistic 
a
Mean Mean
DISC 5.475 4.980 0.495 1.002
IMP / AST 0.002 0.009 - 0.007 1.619
IMP / EQT 0.013 0.018 - 0.005 0.398
IMP / GDW 0.006 0.070 - 0.064 **2.152
ROE 0.059 0.091 - 0.032 1.482
AVG.ROE - 0.033 0.163 - 0.196 1.985
A.C.MEET. 3.373 3.647 - 0.274 0.781
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.221 0.406 - 0.185  ***8.854
SIZE 13.427 12.716 0.711  **2.211
a Significantly different at the 0.10 level (*), 0.05 level (**) or the 0.01 level (***).
 Table 5. Descriptive Statistics
Panel 5C provides a comparison between the mean values of each variable, with reference,
respectively, to the Italian and British cases.
In particular:
• the mean score of disclosure among the Italian sample (equal to 5.5) is statistically
indistinguishable from the correspondent mean value among the British sample (equal
to 5.0);
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• the  mean  values  of  goodwill  write-offs  scaled  by  goodwill  and  of  number  of
independent  directors members of  the audit  committee  scaled by  total  number of
directors, are significantly greater for the British cases;
• the mean value of firm size is significantly greater for the Italian cases.
Of particular interest,  the difference in terms of independent directors proportion is  highly
significant,  as  the  percentage  equal  to  22.1% for  the  Italian  cases  rises  to  40.6% with
reference to the British observations.
Table 6 reports on the association between goodwill impairment and disclosure.
Panel 6A: Italian companies – Total cases
Variable
Cases without
goodwill impairment
(n = 46)
Cases with 
goodwill impairment
 (n = 13)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 5.174 6.538 - 1.364 2.457 ***
Panel 6B: British companies – Total cases
Variable
Cases without
goodwill impairment
(n = 37)
Cases with 
goodwill impairment
 (n = 14)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 5.297 4.143 1.154 1.364
Panel 6C: Italian and British companies – Cases without goodwill impairment
Variable Italian companies(n = 46)
British companies
(n = 37)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 5.174 5.297 - 0.123 0.215
Panel 6D: Italian and British companies – Cases with goodwill impairment
Variable Italian companies(n = 13)
British companies
(n = 14)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 6.538 4.143 2.395 2.874 ***
a Significantly different at the 0.10 level (*), 0.05 level (**) or the 0.01 level (***).
Table 6. Goodwill Impairment and Disclosure
Panel 6A shows that the mean score of disclosure for the Italian sampled firms is significantly
greater (at the 0.01 level) with reference to the cases with goodwill  impairment: this first
finding is consistent with the positive assumed association between goodwill  write-offs and
level of disclosure.
In contrast, as shown in Panel 6B, the level of disclosure among the British cases with goodwill
write-offs is statistically indistinguishable from the mean value of non-impairing observations.
Moreover, Panel 6C reports that the difference in mean value of Italian and British disclosure
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score is not significant in non-impairing cases, while Panel 6D shows that the difference in
mean score of disclosure among the Italian cases with goodwill write-offs is significantly (at
the 0.01 level) greater than the mean value among the British impairment observations.
Table 7 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between variables for the Italian and British
cases.
Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable Disc Imp /Ast
Imp /
Eqt
Imp /
Gdw Roe
Avg.
Roe
A.C.
Meet.
A.C.Ind
.Dir. Size
DISC 1.00
IMP / AST 0.03 1.00
IMP / EQT 0.10 0.77 1.00
IMP / GDW 0.00 0.66 0.43 1.00
ROE 0.12 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 1.00
AVG.ROE 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.25 1.00
A.C.MEET. 0.07 0.17 0.20 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 1.00
A.C.IND.DIR. -0.14 0.22 0.15 0.28 0.00 0.07 0.26 1.00
SIZE 0.35 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 0.14 -0.09 0.18 -0.31 1.00
YEAR.06 -0.12 0.05 0.10 -0.09 0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.05 0.03
YEAR.07 -0.09 -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 0.22 0.05 -0.07 0.03 0.03
YEAR.08 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.23 -0.26 0.07 0.19 0.02 -0.05
SECT.A -0.08 0.30 0.28 0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.18 0.28 -0.41
SECT.B 0.22 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 0.02 0.06 -0.12 0.02 -0.22
SECT.C 0.30 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.30 0.07 -0.05 0.37
SECT.D -0.15 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 0.13 0.01 -0.20 -0.46 0.26
SECT.E -0.21 -0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.25 0.11
Country 0.10 -0.16 -0.04 -0.22 -0.14 -0.18 -0.07 -0.64 0.21
Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable Year.06
Year.
07
Year.
08
SECT.
A
SECT.
B
SECT.
C
SECT.
D
SECT.
E Country
YEAR.06 1.00
YEAR.07 -0.44 1.00
YEAR.08 -0.52 -0.54 1.00
SECT.A 0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00
SECT.B 0.02 -0.09 0.07 -0.30 1.00
SECT.C 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.20 -0.17 1.00
SECT.D -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.37 -0.31 -0.21 1.00
SECT.E -0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.26 -0.21 -0.14 -0.27 1.00
Country 0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.15 0.05 0.13 0.10 -0.11 1.00
Table 7. Univariate Correlations – Italian and British Companies
Two variables related to goodwill impairment are correlated with the disclosure score (with
Pearson coefficients  equal  to  0.03 and 0.10 respectively  for  IMP/AST and IMP/EQT).  Both
profitability ratios are positively correlated with the disclosure score (with coefficients equal to
0.12 and 0.15 respectively for ROE and AVG.ROE).
We also note positive coefficients related to firm size and to the dummy variable referred to
the  year  2008.  The  results  referred  to  the  variables  concerning  the  quality  of  corporate
governance are controversial,  as the first correlation is  positive (A.C.MEET equal to 0.07),
whilst the second is negative (A.C.IND.DIR. equal to -0.14).
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Table  8  provides  Pearson  correlation  coefficients  between  variables  for  the  entire  Italian
sample.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables
Variable Disc Imp /Ast
Imp /
Eqt
Imp /
Gdw Roe
Avg.
Roe
A.C.
Meet.
A.C.Ind
.Dir. Size
DISC 1.00
IMP / AST 0.15 1.00
IMP / EQT 0.14 0.99 1.00
IMP / GDW 0.14 0.91 0.88 1.00
ROE 0.29 0.09 0.07 0.08 1.00
AVG.ROE 0.23 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.31 1.00
A.C.MEET. -0.02 0.22 0.21 0.32 -0.09 0.00 1.00
A.C.IND.DIR. -0.27 0.20 0.20 0.19 -0.15 -0.03 0.39 1.00
SIZE 0.38 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.06 -0.48 1.00
YEAR.06 -0.08 0.16 0.18 0.11 -0.01 -0.19 -0.17 -0.04 0.02
YEAR.07 -0.16 -0.11 -0.09 -0.18 0.18 0.08 -0.08 0.05 0.00
YEAR.08 0.23 -0.04 -0.08 0.06 -0.15 0.11 0.24 -0.01 -0.02
SECT.A -0.16 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.39 -0.52
SECT.B 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.09 -0.20 0.29 -0.37
SECT.C 0.29 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.33 0.08 -0.07 0.36
SECT.D 0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.26 0.11 -0.20 -0.67 0.53
SECT.E -0.49 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.27 -0.01 0.21 0.19 -0.02
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables
Variable Year.06
Year.
07
Year.
08 SECT.A SECT.B SECT.C SECT.D SECT.E
YEAR.06 1.00
YEAR.07 -0.44 1.00
YEAR.08 -0.55 -0.51 1.00
SECT.A -0.08 0.05 0.03 1.00
SECT.B -0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.27 1.00
SECT.C 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.20 -0.21 1.00
SECT.D 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.35 -0.37 -0.27 1.00
SECT.E -0.03 0.11 -0.08 -0.19 -0.20 -0.15 -0.25 1.00
Table 8. Univariate Correlations – Italian Companies
Of particular interest, all the three variables related to goodwill impairment exhibit a positive
correlation with the level of disclosure (equal to 0.15, 0.14 and 0.14 respectively for IMP/AST,
IMP/EQT and IMP/GDW). As predicted, this provides a preliminary indication on a univariate
basis that the magnitude of goodwill write-offs is positively associated with the degree of firm
disclosure on impairment test.
Moreover, both return on equity ratios are positively correlated with the disclosure score (with
Pearson coefficients  equal to 0.29 and 0.23 respectively  for ROE and AVG.ROE). Also this
finding is consistent with our hypothesis.
The level of disclosure is also positively correlated with our proxy for firm size, suggesting that
the costs of disclosure decrease for larger firms, and with the dummy variable referred to the
year 2008, confirming the predicted improvement in corporate disclosure before the first years
of IAS 36 application.
Surprisingly, both the corporate governance related variables exhibit negative coefficients.
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Pearson correlation coefficients between variables for the whole British sample are shown in
Table 9. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables
Variable Disc Imp /Ast
Imp /
Eqt
Imp /
Gdw Roe
Avg.
Roe
A.C.
Meet.
A.C.Ind.
Dir. Size
DISC 1.00
IMP / AST 0.01 1.00
IMP / EQT 0.04 0.94 1.00
IMP / GDW 0.01 0.66 0.68 1.00
ROE -0.07 -0.20 -0.26 -0.26 1.00
AVG.ROE 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.03 0.04 1.00
A.C.MEET. 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.02 -0.09 -0.22 1.00
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.27 -0.08 -0.18 0.03 1.00
SIZE 0.30 -0.23 -0.25 -0.10 0.24 -0.18 0.55 0.07 1.00
YEAR.06 -0.17 0.02 -0.04 -0.14 0.17 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.01
YEAR.07 -0.01 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 0.26 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.08
YEAR.08 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.33 -0.40 -0.03 0.11 0.09 -0.08
SECT.A 0.02 0.30 0.30 0.09 -0.27 0.22 0.15 0.09 -0.27
SECT.B 0.33 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 0.01 0.04 0.10 -0.25 -0.09
SECT.C 0.30 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.26 0.38
SECT.D -0.56 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 0.00 -0.26 -0.19 -0.30 -0.08
SECT.E 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.19 0.32 0.02 -0.11 0.29 0.27
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables
Variable Year.
06
Year.
07
Year.
08 SECT.A SECT.B SECT.C SECT. D SECT. E
YEAR.06 1.00
YEAR.07 -0.43 1.00
YEAR.08 -0.49 -0.57 1.00
SECT.A 0.12 -0.06 -0.06 1.00
SECT.B 0.06 -0.11 0.05 -0.33 1.00
SECT.C 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.18 -0.12 1.00
SECT.D -0.13 0.10 0.03 -0.39 -0.26 -0.14 1.00
SECT.E -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.35 -0.23 -0.12 -0.27 1.00
Table 9. Univariate Correlations – British Companies
Contrary to the Italian findings, the coefficients report no significant relation between goodwill
impairment ratios and the level of disclosure (with Pearson coefficients equal to 0.01, 0.04 and
0.01 respectively for IMP/AST, IMP/EQT and IMP/GDW). 
Furthermore, both return on equity ratios are not significantly correlated with the disclosure
score (with Pearson coefficient equal to - 0.07 for ROE and 0.01 for AVG.ROE).
However, similarly to the Italian results, the level of disclosure is positively correlated with firm
size and with the dummy variable referred to the year 2008.
The two corporate governance variables show positive coefficients, in contrast with the Italian
cases.
As discussed earlier, we conducted regression tests by including only one proxy at a time for
goodwill  impairment  and  profitability,  also  in  order  to  mitigate  possible  effects  of
multicollinearity (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). In Tables 7, 8 and 9 it has been observed, as a result,
that  the highest  simple  correlation  between the independent  variables  considered in  each
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regression model does not exceed 0.70, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to pose a
serious problem in the interpretation of the results of the multivariate analysis  (Hossain  &
Hammami, 2009).
Regression Results
Table 10 reports on multivariate tests of the determinants of corporate disclosure in the Italian
and British sample. 
Dependent Variable: Disc
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
INTERCEPT **-5.336 -2.138 0.035 **-5.315 -2.168 0.033 *-4.956 -1.979 0.051
IMP / AST *16.805 1.746 0.084
IMP / EQT **7.037 2.458 0.016
IMP / GDW 1.672 1.117 0.267
ROE **3.892 1.995 0.049 *3.685 1.916 0.058 **4.058 2.055 0.043
AVG.ROE
A.C.MEET. -0.086 -0.714 0.477 -0.110 -0.915 0.362 -0.050 -0.413 0.680
A.C.IND.DIR. -2.966 -1.314 0.192 -3.111 -1.397 0.166 -3.192 -1.386 0.169
SIZE ***0.729 4.517 0.000 ***0.741 4.662 0.000 ***0.697 4.312 0.000
YEAR.07 0.430 0.829 0.409 0.500 0.975 0.332 0.340 0.654 0.515
YEAR.08 ***1.541 3.070 0.003 ***1.617 3.261 0.002 ***1.427 2.781 0.007
SECT.A ***1.934 2.785 0.006 ***1.868 2.728 0.008 ***2.124 3.042 0.003
SECT.B ***3.013 4.182 0.000 ***3.006 4.242 0.000 ***3.062 4.160 0.000
SECT.C ***2.620 3.072 0.003 ***2.608 3.102 0.003 ***2.721 3.142 0.002
SECT.D -0.118 -0.164 0.870 -0.156 -0.220 0.826 -0.046 -0.064 0.949
Country -0.399 -0.719 0.474 -0.532 -0.971 0.334 -0.414 -0.739 0.462
n 110 110 110
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.371 0.340
Variable
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
INTERCEPT **-5.388 -2.176 0.032 **-5.371 -2.207 0.030 **-5.022 -2.019 0.046
IMP / AST **15.985 1.671 0.098
IMP / EQT **6.797 2.385 0.019
IMP / GDW 1.390 0.937 0.351
ROE
AVG.ROE **0.896 2.317 0.023 **0.851 2.228 0.028 **0.915 2.343 0.021
A.C.MEET. -0.083 -0.688 0.493 -0.106 -0.887 0.377 -0.049 -0.411 0.682
A.C.IND.DIR. -2.703 -1.203 0.232 -2.858 -1.290 0.200 -2.867 -1.251 0.214
SIZE ***0.752 4.745 0.000 ***0.762 4.888 0.000 ***0.722 4.549 0.000
YEAR.07 0.397 0.768 0.445 0.467 0.915 0.363 0.307 0.593 0.554
YEAR.08 **1.224 2.475 0.015 ***1.314 2.684 0.009 **1.118 2.205 0.030
SECT.A **1.798 2.599 0.011 **1.740 2.550 0.012 ***1.969 2.828 0.006
SECT.B ***3.019 4.223 0.000 ***3.014 4.283 0.000 ***3.051 4.170 0.000
SECT.C ***2.856 3.308 0.001 ***2.832 3.328 0.001 ***2.940 3.359 0.001
SECT.D -0.001 -0.001 0.999 -0.044 -0.063 0.950 0.063 0.088 0.930
Country -0.367 -0.664 0.508 -0.496 -0.909 0.365 -0.386 -0.693 0.490
n 110 110 110
Adjusted R2 0.361 0.379 0.349
* Significant At The 0.10 Level; ** Significant At The 0.05 Level; *** Significant At The 0.01 Level.
Table 10. Multivariate Linear Regressions – Italian and British Companies
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The analysis of the residuals, founded on the exam of histograms and normal probability plots,
confirms in all the models that the Ordinary Least Squares regressions are the most suitable
techniques for testing our hypotheses. In addition, we calculated the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) score for each independent variable, in order to evaluate whether multicollinearity may
be a cause of concern. VIF scores higher than 10 are commonly taken as an indication of
multicollinearity: in our cases, the highest VIF obtained is only 2.715.  
The specification for the six multivariate regressions (Model 1 to 6) is provided in Section 4.
Model 1 and Model 4 scale goodwill impairment by total assets; the performance indicators
are, respectively, ROE and AVG.ROE.
The multiple linear regressions show that the association between goodwill impairment and the
dependent variable DISC is significant at the 0.10 level in the predicted sense; the disclosure
level is significantly and positively associated at the 0.05 level with the alternative profitability
ratios. The model adjusted R2 are equal to about 0.35.
Model 2 and Model 5 scale goodwill  impairment by total  assets. As expected, the multiple
linear  regressions  shows  that  the  dependent  variable  DISC  is  significantly  and  positively
associated (at the 0.05 level) with goodwill impairment, with the model adjusted R2 equal to
about 0.37. The positive association between DISC and performance indicators is significant
respectively at the 90% and 95% confidence level.
Finally, when in Models 3 and 6 goodwill  impairment is scaled by goodwill,  the association
between goodwill write-offs and disclosure is not significant, whilst the alternative profitability
ratios  are significantly  associated with  disclosure score in the predicted sense.  The model
adjusted R2 is equal to about 0.34.
In  summary,  addressing  the  first  research  question  of  the  positive  association  between
goodwill write-offs and disclosure (see H1), the findings are significant in the predicted sense
in four models.      
Looking at the research question of the positive association between earnings performance and
corporate disclosure (see H2), in all six models ROE and AVG.ROE coefficients are statistically
significant in the predicted direction.
In all six regressions the model adjusted R2 is higher than 0.3.
Furthermore, all six models show that the level of disclosure is highly significantly associated in
the prediction sense with firm size and with the dummy variable referred to the year 2008,
confirming the findings of the univariate tests. As predicted, also the coefficients of the dummy
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variables for  each sector,  only except for sector D, are highly  significantly associated with
corporate disclosure. 
Other similar regression models, not presented in Table 10, show negative but insignificant
coefficients  associated  with  dummy  variable  YEAR.2006,  and  positive  but  insignificant
coefficients on dummy variable SECT.E.
In all six models the coefficients referred to the quality of corporate governance are negative
but statistically insignificant. Similarly, the dummy variable for the country exhibit coefficients
always  insignificant,  showing  that  firm nationality  does  not  influence  the  general  level  of
disclosure about goodwill impairment test.
Next, we examine separately the two samples of Italian and British firms, in order to test if the
results have been affected by inclusion of Italian company, having regard to our third research
question (see H3).
Table 11 reports on multivariate tests of the determinants of corporate disclosure in the Italian
sample. 
In order to test whether relevant multicollinearity is affecting the results, we performed the
Variance Inflation Factor for the Italian cases: the maximum VIF is equal to only 4.394, so
confirming that multicollinearity among the predictor variables is not a problem. Moreover, the
analysis  of  the  residuals  through  the  Durbin-Watson  test  does  not  provide  evidence  of
autocorrelation.
Model 1a scales goodwill impairment by total assets; the performance indicator is ROE.
As  expected,  the  multiple  linear  regression  shows  that  the  dependent  variable  DISC  is
significantly and positively associated (at the 0.05 level) with goodwill impairment and (at the
0.10 level) with return on equity ratio. The model adjusted R2 is equal to 0.47.
Similarly,  in  Model  4a,  when goodwill  impairment  is  scaled  by  total  assets  again  and  the
performance indicator is  AVG.ROE, the level  of  disclosure is  significantly  associated in the
predicted direction with goodwill impairment (at the 0.05 level) as well as return on equity
ratio, with the model adjusted R2 equal to 0.50.
In  the  Italian  sample,  addressing  the  first  research  question  of  the  positive  association
between goodwill  write-offs and disclosure (see H1),  this finding of the value-relevance of
goodwill impairment is confirmed when alternative scalars are used. Actually, as can be seen
from Table 11, when impairment goodwill is scaled by equity (Model 2a and Model 5a), the
magnitude of goodwill write-offs is positively associated with corporate disclosure at the 95%
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confidence level. Finally, in Models 3a and 6a, the level of disclosure is positively associated
(respectively  at  the  90% and  95% confidence  level)  with  goodwill  impairment  scaled  by
goodwill.
Dependent variable: DISC
Variable
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
INTERCEPT *-7.270 -1.968 0.055 *-7.305 -1.972 0.054 **-7.876 -2.117 0.040
IMP / AST **48.907 2.127 0.039
IMP / EQT **6.510 2.055 0.045
IMP / GDW *25.334 1.986 0.053
ROE *4.233 1.714 0.093 *4.393 1.779 0.082 4.227* 1.701 0.096
AVG.ROE
A.C.MEET. 0.010 0.072 0.943 0.010 0.071 0.944 -0.022 -0.155 0.878
A.C.IND.DIR. -4.600 -1.332 0.189 -4.647 -1.341 0.186 -4.610 -1.327 0.191
SIZE ***0.766 2.836 0.007 ***0.771 2.848 0.007 ***0.819 3.006 0.004
YEAR.07 0.054 0.081 0.936 0.033 0.050 0.960 0.047 0.069 0.945
YEAR.08 *1.202 1.887 0.065 *1.241 1.931 0.060 *1.112 1.752 0.086
SECT.A ***3.046 2.867 0.006 ***3.068 2.882 0.006 ***3.231 3.055 0.004
SECT.B ***4.327 4.198 0.000 ***4.292 4.152 0.000 ***4.325 4.173 0.000
SECT.C ***3.643 3.280 0.002 ***3.596 3.228 0.002 ***3.617 3.238 0.002
SECT.D 1.682 1.513 0.137 1.636 1.466 0.149 1.519 1.353 0.183
n 59 59 59
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.463 0.460
Variable
Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
INTERCEPT *-6.837 -1.915 0.062 *-6.917 -1.927 0.060 **-7.459 -2.075 0.044
IMP / AST **50.008 2.259 0.029
IMP / EQT **6.509 2.123 0.039
IMP / GDW **25.922 2.112 0.040
ROE
AVG.ROE **0.969 2.539 0.014 **0.970 2.526 0.015 **0.967 2.516 0.015
A.C.MEET. 0.017 0.129 0.898 0.018 0.138 0.891 -0.015 -0.114 0.910
A.C.IND.DIR. -4.426 -1.325 0.191 -4.477 -1.332 0.189 -4.437 -1.320 0.193
SIZE ***0.732 2.804 0.007 ***0.741 2.820 0.007 ***0.787 2.986 0.004
YEAR.07 -0.007 -0.011 0.991 -0.028 -0.043 0.966 -0.014 -0.022 0.982
YEAR.08 0.851 1.370 0.177 0.880 1.399 0.168 0.760 1.228 0.226
SECT.A ***3.284 3.298 0.002 ***3.336 3.339 0.002 ***3.473 3.510 0.001
SECT.B ***4.618 4.840 0.000 ***4.606 4.799 0.000 ***4.616 4.808 0.000
SECT.C ***4.441 3.999 0.000 ***4.397 3.935 0.000 ***4.412 3.947 0.000
SECT.D **2.200 2.103 0.041 **2.174 2.064 0.045 *2.032 1.917 0.061
n 59 59 59
Adjusted R2 0.501 0.495 0.495
* Significant At The 0.10 Level; ** Significant At The 0.05 Level; *** Significant At The 0.01 Level.
Table 11. Multivariate Linear Regressions – Italian Companies
With reference to the second research question, concerning the positive association between
earnings performance and corporate disclosure (see H2), in all six models ROE and AVG.ROE
coefficients are statistically significant in the predicted direction, at the 90% (Models 1a, 2a
and 3a) or 95% (Models 4a, 5a and 6a) confidence level.
In all six regressions the model adjusted R2 is higher than 0.45.
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It  should be noted that the similarity of  the coefficients  on both goodwill  impairment and
performance indicators give confidence in the robustness of the results across the different
scalars.
Furthermore, all six models show that the level of disclosure is highly significantly associated in
the prediction sense with firm size and with the dummy variables for each sector (only except
for sector D).
Other similar regression models, not presented in Table 11, show negative but insignificant
coefficients associated with dummy variable YEAR.2006, and negative coefficients on dummy
variable SECT.E, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
The coefficients related to the quality of corporate governance are not significant, while the
positive coefficient referring to the dummy variable for the year 2008 is significant at the 90%
level in the first three models.
Table 12 reports on multivariate tests of the determinants of corporate disclosure in the British
sample. 
Also in the British cases, the VIF scores calculated for each independent variable confirm that
multicollinearity does not represent a problem, as the largest VIF score is equal to only 3.444.
Similarly to the Italian results, the analysis of the residuals through the Durbin-Watson test
does not provide evidence of autocorrelation.
As can be seen, the multiple linear regressions shows that in all six models (Model 1b to Model
6b)  the coefficients  on goodwill  impairment  are  statistically  insignificant,  with  each model
adjusted R2 around 0.42.
Furthermore, no relation is found between return on equity ratios and disclosure score: in all
six models the coefficients are negative but not statistically significant.
However, all six regressions show that the level of disclosure is significantly associated in the
prediction sense with the dummy variable for the year 2008, while the positive coefficients
related to firm size are not significant. Looking at the dummy variables referred to firm sector,
only SECT.D is significantly associated to score disclosure. 
Other  similar  regression models,  not  presented in Table 12,  show negative  coefficients  on
dummy variable YEAR.2006, statistically significant at the 0.10 level, and positive coefficients
associated with dummy variable SECT.E, significant at the 0.01 level.
 -779-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.415
Dependent variable: DISC
Variable
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
INTERCEPT 1.403 0.374 0.710 1.017 0.270 0.788 1.461 0.410 0.684
IMP / AST -0.206 -0.018 0.985
IMP / EQT 1.708 0.290 0.773
IMP / GDW -0.359 -0.239 0.812
ROE -1.210 -0.384 0.703 -1.154 -0.366 0.716 -1.336 -0.418 0.678
AVG.ROE
A.C.MEET. 0.311 0.784 0.438 0.270 0.715 0.479 0.314 0.882 0.383
A.C.IND.DIR. -1.304 -0.400 0.691 -1.223 -0.374 0.710 -1.184 -0.359 0.721
SIZE 0.195 0.674 0.504 0.228 0.812 0.422 0.191 0.728 0.471
YEAR.07 1.219 1.683 0.100 *1.240 1.722 0.093 1.213* 1.690 0.099
YEAR.08 *1.464 1.940 0.060 *1.447 1.914 0.063 1.495* 1.955 0.058
SECT.A -0.168 -0.161 0.873 -0.134 -0.129 0.898 -0.206 -0.197 0.845
SECT.B 1.400 1.197 0.239 1.504 1.288 0.205 1.343 1.168 0.250
SECT.C 2.232 1.634 0.110 2.218 1.626 0.112 2.177 1.573 0.124
SECT.D ***-2.980 -2.974 0.005 ***-2.923 -2.909 0.006 ***-3.022 -3.006 0.005
n 51 51 51
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.419 0.419
Variable
Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
INTERCEPT 1.558 0.409 0.685 1.153 0.305 0.762 1.623 0.445 0.658
IMP / AST 0.328 0.029 0.977
IMP / EQT 2.501 0.414 0.681
IMP / GDW -0.218 -0.147 0.884
ROE
AVG.ROE -0.465 -0.394 0.696 -0.576 -0.479 0.635 -0.450 -0.383 0.704
A.C.MEET. 0.279 0.681 0.500 0.220 0.556 0.581 0.290 0.792 0.433
A.C.IND.DIR. -1.582 -0.466 0.644 -1.559 -0.461 0.647 -1.486 -0.431 0.668
SIZE 0.189 0.658 0.515 0.232 0.827 0.413 0.181 0.694 0.492
YEAR.07 1.221 1.687 0.100 *1.244 1.731 0.091 *1.214 1.691 0.099
YEAR.08 **1.577 2.230 0.032 **1.547 2.183 0.035 **1.601 2.203 0.034
SECT.A -0.012 -0.012 0.991 0.030 0.030 0.976 -0.035 -0.035 0.973
SECT.B 1.460 1.262 0.214 1.583 1.375 0.177 1.416 1.252 0.218
SECT.C *2.332 1.746 0.089 *2.304 1.727 0.092 *2.307 1.713 0.095
SECT.D ***-3.002 -2.961 0.005 ***-2.959 -2.932 0.006 ***-3.026 -2.986 0.005
n 51 51 51
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.420 0.418
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 12. Multivariate Linear Regressions – British Companies
As  in  the  Italian  sample,  the  corporate  governance  related  indicators  exhibit  insignificant
associations.
Discussion
In a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairments, we find a relatively low
frequency of write-offs. Only 27 of the 110 observed cases (25% of the entire sample) record
goodwill impairments, with a statistically insignificant difference between the Italian and the
British cases.
Similarly, the level of disclosure on impairment test provided in the notes to the consolidated
financial statements is relatively low, albeit the items identified to measure disclosure score
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are mandatory in accordance with the requirements of IAS 36.
Regarding the whole sample, with a maximum score that a company could achieve equal to
10,  the  mean  value  of  the  level  of  disclosure  does  not  reach  6.  There  is  no  significant
difference between 59 Italian cases (with a mean disclosure score equal to 5.5) and 51 British
cases (with a mean disclosure score equal to 5.0).
However, as expected, the degree of disclosure tends to improve from 2006 to 2008, and it is
influenced by firm sector. 
Looking at the first research question (see H1), the results confirm that Italian companies
provide more information about impairment test when goodwill is impaired, with the strength
of the positive association between the level of disclosure and the magnitude of goodwill write-
offs across a variety of model specifications.
This  finding suggests that the level  of  disclosure, as assumed, could represent a relevant
indicator of the degree of reliability with which Italian companies have implemented IAS 36
requirements on goodwill impairment test.
In addition, to examine the second research question (see H2), the Italian data confirms, both
in  univariate  and  multivariate  analysis,  our  hypothesis,  finding  a  significant  association
between  disclosure score  and accounting performance  in  the predicted  direction.  In  other
words, Italian firms with lower return on equity ratio tend to provide less information about
goodwill impairment test.
For British cases we assumed (see H3) a lower degree of positive association between the level
of disclosure and the magnitude of goodwill impairments as well as the return on equity ratios.
Indeed, beyond expectation, the data of British sampled companies does not confirm that the
level  of  disclosure  is  significantly  associated  with  goodwill  write-offs  or  accounting
performance.
In summary, it should be noted that the general level of disclosure about goodwill impairment
test provided by British companies, although not more satisfactory respect to the Italian cases,
seems to be smoother, as it is less affected by managers’ decision to take goodwill write-offs
and less influenced by corporate accounting performance.
Our results suggest that despite the mandatory nature of disclosure requirements, there are
significant variations in disclosure score across firms. Overall, the degree of information about
goodwill impairment, in both the Italian and the British cases, is not influenced by the quality
of the corporate governance. Both the level of activity of the audit committee, measured by
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the number of meeting held in year, and the percentage of the independent directors with an
active  role,  identified  by  membership  of  the  audit  committee,  do  not  exhibit  significant
associations with corporate disclosure of impairment tests. 
These findings are consistent with those studies that specifically noted that the proportion of
directors who are independent does not affect  the quality  of  mandatory (Forker,  1992) or
voluntary (Ho & Wong, 2001; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006) disclosure.
Indeed,  as  discussed  earlier,  the  results  of  previous  research  regarding  the  association
between board independence and the quality  of  corporate  information are heterogeneous:
some works provide evidence of a positive association between the two variables (Chen  &
Jaggi, 2000), whilst others found a negative relationship (Eng & Mak, 2003). 
Thus the question remains whether independent directors contribute to increase mandatory or
voluntary disclosure or whether they are ineffective (García–Meca & Sánchez–Ballesta, 2010).
Moreover,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  practice  it  is  rather  difficult  to  classify  independent
directors  as  truly  independent  from  management:  as  a  consequence,  some  nominally
independent directors may be valuable, while others are not (Di Pietra, Grambovas, Raonic &
Riccaboni, 2008).
On the other hand, with regard to the object of our research, an alternative or more specific
explanation could be that the significant estimates required in order to assess the recoverable
amount of goodwill  stress the importance of director’s inside perspective for improving the
quality of control and disclosure. In particular, the certification of such information disclosure,
also by the audit committee, necessarily requires some firm-specific expertise on the part of
directors. Therefore, the independence of directors may reduce the ability to acquire firm-
specific information inherent in impairment test assumptions (Biondi, Giannocolo & Reberioux,
2010).
Additional Analysis: The Last Years of IAS 36 Application
Despite the objective of our study is to test the initial impact of IAS 36 in the first years of its
application, it seems interesting to extent the analysis of the goodwill disclosure with reference
to the last years of IAS 36 application. These additional research also represents a robustness
test with reference to our previous findings.
As a consequence, we examine the 2011 and 2012 financial statements of the same Italian
and British companies included in our sample, as defined in Section 4, also in order to verify if
the positive trend of progressive improvement of goodwill disclosure is confirmed. 
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Table 13 details the sample selection criteria for the years 2011 and 2012: our final sample
consists of 82 financial statements.
Italian companies British companies Total
Number of the same companies included 
in the final sample of our previous 
analysis
27 21 48
First number of consolidated financial 
statements 2011 – 2012 54 42 96
Less:
Financial statements of companies not 
more listed - 2 - 6 - 8
Financial statements with zero goodwill 
value 0 - 5 - 5
Financial statements with negative book 
value of equity - 1 0 - 1
Final sample 51 31 82
Table 13. Sample Selection Procedure for The Years 2011-2012
Of our 82 observations, as shown in Table 14, only 26% record goodwill impairment. These
results are very similar to the percentage (25%) of non-impairment described in Section 5
with reference to the first years (2006-2008) of IAS application.
Italian cases British cases Total
n % n % n %
No goodwill impairment 38 75% 23 74% 61 74%
Goodwill impairment 13 25% 8 26% 21 26%
Total 51 100% 31 100% 82 100%
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.975
Table 14. Frequency of Goodwill Impairments
Also in this additional time period of analysis we note that the chi-square statistic  for the
comparison of impairment frequency across firm country is not statistically significant (p-value
of 0.975), as the frequency of goodwill non-impairment in the Italian (51 cases) and British
(31 cases) samples is almost the same (respectively, 25% and 26%).
Table 15, by analogy with Table 5, presents some descriptive statistics for all the variables,
with reference to the Italian and British companies. We specify that now the variable AVG.ROE
refers to the average ROE in the period 2011-2012.
As regards the disclosure quality, Panel 15A and Panel 15B provide evidence of improvement,
confirming our hypothesis. The mean value of disclosure score is 6.9 in the Italian sample
(equal  to 5.5 in the period 2006-2008) and 6.1 with reference to the British observations
(equal  to  5.0  in  the  period  2006-2008).  However,  these  results  are  still  unsatisfactory,
considering that all  the ten items (Table 2) identified to measure the quality  of  corporate
information about goodwill are mandatory.
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Panel 15A: Italian Companies
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standarddeviation
DISC 6.922 8.000 0.000 10.000 2.407
IMP / AST 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.004
IMP / EQT 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.280 0.049
IMP / GDW 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.280 0.049
ROE 0.010 0.035 - 1.202 0.825 0.320
AVG.ROE 0.013 0.041 - 0.957 0.448 0.232
A.C.MEET. 4.157 4.000 0.000 12.000 2.595
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.234 0.231 0.000 0.429 0.099
SIZE 13.225 12.813 10.594 16.258 1.522
n = 51
Panel 15B: British Companies
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standarddeviation
DISC 6.129 6.000 0.000 9.000 1.928
IMP / AST 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.018
IMP / EQT 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.051
IMP / GDW 0.057 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.187
ROE 0.079 0.105 - 0.402 0.448 0.156
AVG.ROE 0.079 0.114 - 0.380 0.225 0.139
A.C.MEET. 3.548 4.000 0.000 8.000 1.786
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.437 0.429 0.167 0.667 0.141
SIZE 12.414 12.583 9.123 15.855 1.729
n = 31
Panel 15C: Italian and British Companies
Variable Italian cases(n = 51)
British cases
(n = 31)
Difference in
mean value t-statistic 
a
Mean Mean
DISC 6.922 6.129 0.793 1.640
IMP / AST 0.001 0.006 - 0.005 1.278
IMP / EQT 0.003 0.016 - 0.013 1.314
IMP / GDW 0.016 0.057 - 0.041 1.211
ROE 0.010 0.079 - 0.069 1.305
AVG.ROE 0.013 0.079 – 0.066 1.590
A.C.MEET. 4.157 3.548 0.609 1.255
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.234 0.437 - 0.203 ***7.040 
SIZE 13.225 12.414 0.811 **2.154 
a Significantly different at the 0.10 level (*), 0.05 level (**) or the 0.01 level (***).
Table 15. Descriptive Statistics
The comparison between the mean values of each variable, with reference, respectively, to the
Italian and British observations for the period 2011-2012, is shown by Panel 15C. In particular,
confirming the results of our previous analysis (see Panel 5C of Table 5), the difference in
terms of disclosure is not significant, the mean value of firm size is significantly greater for the
Italian cases and the proportion of independent directors is significantly greater for the British
observations. 
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Table 16 reports on the association between goodwill impairment and disclosure.
Panel 16A: Italian companies – Total cases
Variable
Cases without
goodwill impairment
(n = 38)
Cases with 
goodwill impairment
 (n = 13)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 6.421 8.385 - 1.964 ***4.084 
Panel 16B: British companies – Total cases
Variable
Cases without
goodwill impairment
(n = 23)
Cases with 
goodwill impairment
 (n = 8)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 6.435 5.250 1.185 1.604
Panel 16C: Italian and British companies – Cases without goodwill impairment
Variable Italian companies(n = 38)
British companies
(n = 23)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 6.421 6.435 - 0.014 0.024
Panel 16D: Italian and British companies – Cases with goodwill impairment
Variable Italian companies(n = 13)
British companies
(n = 8)
Difference
in mean
value
t-statistic a
Mean Mean
DISC 8.385 5.250 3.135 ***4.714
a Significantly different at the 0.10 level (*), 0.05 level (**) or the 0.01 level (***).
Table 16. Goodwill Impairment and Disclosure
Of particular interest, the results corroborate our findings for the period 2006-2008 (see Tabel
6): also in the last years of IAS 36 application only for the Italian sampled firms (Panel 16A)
the mean score of disclosure is significantly greater (at the 0.01 level) with reference to the
cases with goodwill impairment, confirming the positive assumed association between goodwill
write-offs and level of disclosure.
Moreover, Panel 16D shows that the difference in mean score of disclosure among the Italian
observations with goodwill write-offs is significantly (at the 0.01 level) greater than the mean
value among the British impairment cases, as well as in the first years of IAS 36 application
(see Panel 6D of Table 6).
Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 provide Pearson correlation coefficients between variables for
the entire sample, only the Italian cases and only the British observations respectively.
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Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable DISC IMP /AST
IMP /
EQT
IMP /
GDW ROE
AVG.
ROE
A.C.
MEET.
A.C.IND.
DIR. SIZE
DISC 1.00
IMP / AST 0.13 1.00
IMP / EQT 0.10 0.91 1.00
IMP / GDW -0.01 0.45 0.51 1.00
ROE 0.33 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 1.00
AVG.ROE 0.43 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.76 1.00
A.C.MEET. 0.07 -0.04 -0.12 -0.14 0.06 0.11 1.00
A.C.IND.DIR. -0.17 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.21 0.28 -0.09 1.00
SIZE 0.26 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.11 0.43 -0.29 1.00
YEAR.11 -0.06 0.14 0.16 0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00
YEAR.12 0.06 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.00
SECT.A 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.48
SECT.B 0.15 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.07 -0.15
SECT.C 0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.37 0.03 0.35
SECT.D -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.23 -0.03 -0.04 -0.27 -040 0.36
SECT.E -0.35 0.09 0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.22 -0.03 0.21 0.02
COUNTRY 0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.12 -0.16 0.13 -0.65 0.24
Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable YEAR.11
YEAR.
12
SECT.
A
SECT.
B
SECT
C
SECT.
D
SECT.
 E COUNTRY
YEAR.11 1.00
YEAR.12 -1.00 1.00
SECT.A -0.03 0.03 1.00
SECT.B 0.00 0.00 -0.33 1.00
SECT.C 0.00 0.00 -0.22 -0.21 1.00
SECT.D 0.03 -0.03 -0.32 -0.31 -0.20 1.00
SECT.E 0.00 0.00 -0.24 -0.24 -0.15 -0.23 1.00
COUNTRY -0.03 0.03 -0.12 -0.03 0.14 0.13 -0.10 1.00
Table 17. Univariate Correlations – Italian and British Companies
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Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable DISC IMP /AST
IMP /
EQT
IMP /
GDW ROE
AVG.
ROE
A.C.
MEET.
A.C.IND.
DIR. SIZE
DISC 1.00
IMP / AST 0.32 1.00
IMP / EQT 0.33 0.99 1.00
IMP / GDW 0.26 0.60 0.69 1.00
ROE 0.45 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
AVG.ROE 0.59 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.73 1.00
A.C.MEET. 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.15 1.00
A.C.IND.DIR. -0.20 -0.25 -0.23 -0.19 0.09 0.14 0.19 1.00
SIZE 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.35 -0.34 1.00
YEAR.11 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.04
YEAR.12 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.04
SECT.A 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.11 0.19 -0.03 0.24 -0.47
SECT.B 0.19 -0.10 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.09 -0.09 0.28 -0.28
SECT.C -0.03 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.24 0.27
SECT.D 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.33 -0.66 0.51
SECT.E -0.55 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.30 -0.42 0.14 -0.03 -0.03
Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable YEAR.11
YEAR.
12
SECT.
A
SECT.
B
SECT.
C
SECT.
D
SECT.
E
YEAR.11 1.00
YEAR.12 -1.00 1.00
SECT.A -0.04 0.04 1.00
SECT.B 0.01 -0.01 -0.29 1.00
SECT.C 0.01 -0.01 -0.23 -0.24 1.00
SECT.D 0.01 -0.01 -0.32 -0.34 -0.27 1.00
SECT.E 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.20 -0.16 -0.22 1.00
Table 18. Univariate Correlations – Italian Companies
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Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable DISC IMP /AST
IMP /
EQT
IMP /
GDW ROE
AVG.
ROE
A.C.
MEET.
A.C.IND.
DIR. SIZE
DISC 1.00
IMP / AST 0.16 1.00
IMP / EQT 0.13 0.91 1.00
IMP / GDW -0.11 0.41 0.48 1.00
ROE 0.03 -0.25 -0.25 -0.14 1.00
AVG.ROE 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.89 1.00
A.C.MEET. 0.22 -0.04 -0.22 -0.26 0.01 0.05 1.00
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.09 0.09 0.14 -0.11 0.44 0.48 -0.34 1.00
SIZE 0.14 0.00 -0.08 -0.14 0.20 0.23 0.59 -0.02 1.00
YEAR.11 0.03 0.25 0.27 0.23 -0.18 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 -0.04
YEAR.12 -0.03 -0.25 -0.27 -0.23 0.18 0.01 0.03 -0.12 0.04
SECT.A 0.21 -0.17 -0.19 -0.18 -0.26 -0.30 0.10 -0.11 -0.46
SECT.B 0.08 0.16 0.04 -0.12 0.16 0.18 0.28 -0.17 0.03
SECT.C 0.40 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.25 0.28 0.14 0.07 0.51
SECT.D -0.63 -0.04 -0.02 0.41 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.13 0.05
SECT.E 0.01 0.12 0.25 0.01 0.11 0.12 -0.34 0.39 0.14
Pearson correlation coefficients between variables
Variable YEAR.11
YEAR.
12
SECT.
A
SECT.
B
SECT.
C
SECT.
D
SECT.
E
YEAR.11 1.00
YEAR.12 -1.00 1.00
SECT.A -0.02 0.02 1.00
SECT.B -0.02 0.02 -0.41 1.00
SECT.C -0.01 0.01 -0.18 -0.15 1.00
SECT.D 0.07 -0.07 -0.30 -0.26 -0.12 1.00
SECT.E -0.02 0.02 -0.34 -0.29 -0.13 -0.21 1.00
Table 19. Univariate Correlations – British Companies
As predicted, we note also for the period 2011-2012 the positive correlations between the
variables related to goodwill impairment and the disclosure score in particular (Table 18) with
reference  to  the  Italian  sample  (with  Pearson  coefficients  equal  to  0.32,  0.33  and  0.26
respectively  for  IMP/AST,  IMP/EQT  and  IMP/GDW).  Both  profitability  ratios  are  positively
correlated with the disclosure score (with coefficients that in the Italian sample reach 0.45 and
0.59 respectively for  ROE and AVG.ROE), also supporting our hypotheses. In all  the three
tables the level of disclosure is positively correlated also with firm size.
Finally,  we conducted regression tests by applying for  the period 2011-2012 the same six
models defined in Section 4. 
Table 20 reports on multivariate tests of the determinants of corporate disclosure in the Italian
and British sample. 
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Dependent variable: DISC
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
Intercept -3.364 -1.265 0.210 -3.858 -1.466 0.147 -4.375 -1.577 0.119
IMP / AST **39.722 2.177 0.033
IMP / EQT **16.470 2.542 0.013
IMP / GDW 2.500 1.370 0.175
ROE ***2.476 3.079 0.003 2.448*** 3.086 0.003 2.306*** 2.826 0.006
AVG.ROE
A.C.MEET. **-0.284 -2.450 0.017 -0.272** -2.365 0.021 -0.297** -2.510 0.014
A.C.IND.DIR. -2.905 -1.420 0.160 -3.022 -1.493 0.140 -2.573 -1.235 0.221
SIZE ***0.770 3.953 0.000 0.796*** 4.150 0.000 0.853*** 4.247 0.000
YEAR.12 0.197 0.484 0.630 0.233 0.575 0.567 0.142 0.341 0.734
SECT.A ***3.056 4.138 0.000 3.235*** 4.395 0.000 3.121*** 4.113 0.000
SECT.B ***2.385 3.407 0.001 2.566*** 3.697 0.000 2.471*** 3.459 0.001
SECT.C *1.603 1.913 0.060 1.671** 2.014 0.048 1.432* 1.685 0.097
SECT.D -0.009 -0.012 0.991 0.096 0.122 0.903 -0.222 -0.270 0.788
COUNTRY 0.317 0.555 0.581 0.301 0.535 0.595 0.301 0.513 0.609
n 82 82 82
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.366 0.325
Variable
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
Intercept -1.779 -0.681 0.498 -2.301 -0.882 0.381 -2.561 -0.937 0.352
IMP / AST *34.634 1.997 0.050
IMP / EQT **13.368 2.145 0.035
IMP / GDW 1.985 1.137 0.260
ROE
AVG.ROE ***4.460 4.137 0.000 ***4.292 3.989 0.000 ***4.356 3.956 0.000
A.C.MEET. ***-0.302 -2.722 0.008 **-0.291 -2.633 0.010 ***-0.312 -2.760 0.007
A.C.IND.DIR. **-4.145 -2.063 0.043 **-4.143 -2.071 0.042 *-3.887 -1.896 0.062
SIZE ***0.702 3.739 0.000 ***0.731 3.916 0.000 ***0.769 3.961 0.000
YEAR.12 0.296 0.761 0.449 0.316 0.815 0.418 0.235 0.597 0.553
SECT.A ***2.610 3.602 0.001 ***2.779 3.805 0.000 ***2.649 3.553 0.001
SECT.B ***1.992 2.907 0.005 ***2.168 3.156 0.002 ***2.055 2.936 0.004
SECT.C *1.387 1.725 0.089 *1.447 1.800 0.076 1.232 1.512 0.135
SECT.D -0.364 -0.472 0.639 -0.257 -0.333 0.740 -0.542 -0.683 0.497
COUNTRY 0.230 0.421 0.675 0.212 0.391 0.697 0.207 0.369 0.713
n 82 82 82
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.413 0.385
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 20. Multivariate Linear Regressions – Italian and British Companies
The maximum VIF  is  equal  to  only  2.928,  so  confirming  that  multicollinearity  among the
predictor variables is not a problem; the analysis of the residuals through the Durbin-Watson
test does not provide evidence of autocorrelation.
The multiple linear regressions show results very similar to those recorded with reference to
the  first  period  of  IAS  36  application  (see  Table  10),  providing  further  evidence  of  the
robustness of our findings.
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In summary, with reference to the period 2011-2012 too:
• the  association  between  goodwill  impairment  and  the  dependent  variable  DISC  is
significant in the predicted sense (see H1) in four models (Model 1, Model 2, Model 4
and Model 5);
• the disclosure level is significantly and positively associated, as expected (see H2),
also with the alternative profitability ratios in all the six models.
In all six regressions the model adjusted R2 is higher than 0.3.
Furthermore, all six models show that the level of disclosure is significantly associated in the
prediction sense with firm size.  We also note  some significant  coefficients  referred to  the
majority of the activity sectors and corporate governance variables.
Other similar regression models, not presented in Table 20, show negative but insignificant
coefficients  associated  with  dummy  variable  YEAR.2011,  and  positive  but  insignificant
coefficients on dummy variable SECT.E.
Table  21  and  Table  22  examine  separately  the  two  samples  of  Italian  and  British  firms
respectively,  providing  evidence  that  also  in  the period 2011-2012  the  results  have  been
affected by inclusion of Italian company, so confirming our third research question too (see
H3).  The largest  VIF  score,  equal  to  4.578 (Table 21) and  6.935 (Table  22) confirm that
multicollinearity does not represent a problem and the analysis of the residuals through the
Durbin-Watson test does not provide evidence of autocorrelation.
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Dependent variable: DISC
Variable
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
Intercept -3.379 -0.988 0.329 -3.448 -1.011 0.318 -4.557 -1.313 0.197
IMP / AST *101.634 1.724 0.092
IMP / EQT *44.708 1.717 0.094
IMP / GDW 3.785 0.705 0.485
ROE ***2.190 2.808 0.008 ***2.205 2.823 0.007 **2.085 2.603 0.013
AVG.ROE
A.C.MEET. -0.106 -0.851 0.400 -0.110 -0.881 0.383 -0.117 -0.906 0.370
A.C.IND.DIR. **-8.048 -2.480 0.017 **-8.036 -2.475 0.018 **-8.455 -2.525 0.016
SIZE **0.710 2.597 0.013 **0.718 2.639 0.012 ***0.816 2.946 0.005
YEAR.12 0.463 1.007 0.320 0.467 1.016 0.316 0.469 0.985 0.330
SECT.A ***4.226 4.471 0.000 ***4.197 4.423 0.000 ***4.453 4.623 0.000
SECT.B ***4.535 5.114 0.000 ***4.486 5.041 0.000 ***4.529 4.882 0.000
SECT.C ***2.789 2.940 0.005 ***2.761 2.915 0.006 ***2.669 2.740 0.009
SECT.D 1.491 1.409 0.167 1.471 1.391 0.172 1.438 1.319 0.195
n 51 51 51
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.542 0.514
Variable
Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
Intercept -1.067 -0.335 0.740 -1.166 -0.366 0.716 -2.591 -0.793 0.432
IMP / AST *106.875 2.005 0.052
IMP / EQT *46.553 1.977 0.055
IMP / GDW 2.808 0.572 0.571
ROE
AVG.ROE ***4.589 4.297 0.000 ***4.595 4.295 0.000 ***4.371 3.939 0.000
A.C.MEET. -0.151 -1.323 0.193 -0.155 -1.357 0.182 -0.162 -1.361 0.181
A.C.IND.DIR. ***-9.123 -3.088 0.004 ***-9.117 -3.081 0.004 ***-9.612 -3.103 0.004
SIZE 0.611** 2.446 0.019 **0.621 2.497 0.017 ***0.743 2.909 0.006
YEAR.12 0.583 1.405 0.168 0.588 1.417 0.164 0.596 1.368 0.179
SECT.A ***3.231 3.522 0.001 ***3.207 3.480 0.001 ***3.534 3.740 0.001
SECT.B ***3.750 4.440 0.000 ***3.702 4.365 0.000 ***3.812 4.279 0.000
SECT.C **2.349 2.697 0.010 **2.320 2.664 0.011 **2.227 2.451 0.019
SECT.D 0.755 0.765 0.449 0.736 0.744 0.461 0.715 0.691 0.493
n 51 51 51
Adjusted R2 0.625 0.624 0.591
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 21. Multivariate Linear Regressions – Italian Companies
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Dependent variable: DISC
Variable
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
Coefficien
t
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
Intercept 5.165 1.061 0.301 4.857 0.995 0.331 3.482 0.711 0.485
IMP / AST 16.674 0.910 0.374
IMP / EQT 6.254 0.950 0.353
IMP / GDW 2.549 1.433 0.167
ROE -1.230 -0.493 0.628 -1.221 -0.492 0.628 -2.100 -0.926 0.366
AVG.ROE
A.C.MEET. 0.059 0.161 0.874 0.082 0.224 0.825 0.066 0.185 0.855
A.C.IND.DIR. 0.923 0.331 0.744 1.023 0.371 0.715 2.115 0.787 0.440
SIZE 0,028 0.065 0.949 0.035 0.082 0.935 0.110 0.261 0.797
YEAR.12 -0.056 -0.092 0.928 -0.035 -0.057 0.955 0.059 0.098 0.923
SECT.A 0,642 0.446 0.661 0.735 0.506 0.618 0.834 0.591 0.561
SECT.B 0.237 0.192 0.850 0.354 0.287 0.777 0.559 0.462 0.649
SECT.C *2.998 2.010 0.058 *3.026 2.031 0.056 *2.932 2.022 0.057
SECT.D **-2.657 -2.555 0.019 **-2.570 -2.445 0.024 ***-3.042 -2.969 0.008
N 31 31 31
Adjusted R2 0.340 0.342 0.376
Variable
Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b
Coefficient t-statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value Coefficient
t-
statistic
p-
value
Intercept 5.296 1.098 0.285 4.902 1.019 0.321 3.580 0.737 0.469
IMP / AST 18.972 1.114 0.278
IMP / EQT 7.622 1.251 0.225
IMP / GDW 2.799 1.568 0.132
ROE
AVG.ROE -2.049 -0.758 0.457 -2.413 -0.901 0.379 -2.867 -1.082 0.292
A.C.MEET. 0.092 0.248 0.806 0.130 0.353 0.728 0.104 0.289 0.775
A.C.IND.DIR. 1.324 0.476 0.639 1.646 0.598 0.557 2.530 0.912 0.372
SIZE 0.001 0.003 0.998 0.003 0.007 0.995 0.086 0.206 0.839
YEAR.12 -0.083 -0.141 0.889 -0.037 -0.062 0.951 -0.017 -0.030 0.977
SECT.A 0.548 0.381 0.707 0.638 0.445 0.661 0.738 0.524 0.606
SECT.B 0.225 0.185 0.855 0.376 0.310 0.760 0.552 0.460 0.651
SECT.C *3.148 2.097 0.049 **3.251 2.172 0.042 **3.050 2.096 0.049
SECT.D **-2.677 -2.593 0.017 **-2.568 -2.480 0.022 ***-3.118 -3.058 0.006
N 31 31 31
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.360 0.385
* Significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 22. Multivariate Linear Regressions – British Companies
As  expected,  only  in  the  Italian  sample  (Table  21)  the  multiple  linear  regressions  shows
positive and significant  associations  both  between disclosure and goodwill  impairment  and
between disclosure and earnings performance, with the model adjusted R2 always higher than
0.50. On the other hand, with reference to the British cases (Table 22), in all the six models
the  corresponding  coefficients  are  not  significant,  confirming  the  results  of  our  preceding
analysis.
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Conclusions
Previous research of goodwill write-offs determinants does not find univocal results, failing to
provide strong evidence on identifying specific factors able to have clear predictive ability for
goodwill impairments. Such limited significance of several variables, included stock prices and
performance indicators, emerging in this empirical context seems due, on the one hand, to the
information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders and, on the other hand, to
the cause that the factors treated by most of literature pertain to the firm as a whole rather
than to the specific cash generating unit to which each goodwill has to be allocated (Hayn &
Hughes, 2006).  
However, a few studies find evidence that non-impairment is associated with agency-based
motives,  especially  firms’  debt  contracting  and  management  bonus,  and  is  increasing  in
financial characteristics, as number or size of reporting units and unverifiable net assets in
reporting units, that serve as proxies for greater unverifiable fair value discretion.
This paper analyses this issue in the context of Italian and British firms’ goodwill accounting,
exploiting an accounting regulation that allows significant unverifiable estimates whilst at the
same time one that requires a high level of disclosure.
Using a sample of firms with market indications of impairment in 2006 - 2008, our research
investigates questions still relatively unexplored, concerning the effects of goodwill write-offs
and accounting performance on corporate disclosure about goodwill impairment test. 
Based on this analysis, this paper puts forward the view, and shows, that corporate disclosure
could be a “litmus paper” able to test the degree of good faith with which each firm has
implemented IAS 36 requirements on goodwill impairment test.
We  provide  empirical  evidence  on  two  aspects  of  such  firms’  mandatory  disclosure:  (1)
whether the level of disclosure is positively related to the magnitude of goodwill write-off and
(2) whether the level of disclosure is positively related to earnings performance.
For both questions, we use a self-constructed score of mandatory disclosure about goodwill
impairment tests in accordance with IAS 36 requirements.
For the sampled Italian firms, as assumed, we find a significant and positive association both
between impairment disclosure and goodwill  write-offs, and between impairment disclosure
and accounting performance. It should be noted that our results are generally independent of
alternative measures of goodwill impairments and earnings performance.
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In  summary,  this  study shows that  impairment  disclosure is  negatively  influenced by two
negative factors:
• managers’  decision  to  avoid  goodwill  write-offs  despite  of  market  indications  of
impairment;
• a decrease of corporate accounting performance.
For the sampled British firms, as companies more used to impairment test rules, we assumed
a lower degree of both associations. The data, beyond expectation, does not confirm that the
level of disclosure is significantly associated to goodwill write-offs or earnings performance.
However, the British disclosure score is not more satisfactory than the Italian cases.
Indeed, the level of  disclosure on impairment test  provided by Italian and British firms is
relatively  low,  albeit  the  items  identified  to  measure  disclosure  score  are  mandatory  in
accordance with the requirements of IAS 36. On the other hand, the data provides evidence on
a significant disclosure improvement with reference to the last observed year (2008). 
The additional analysis that we conducted with reference to the last years of IAS 36 application
(2011-2012), in order to test the robustness of our findings, confirms our previous results and
provides evidence of better but still unsatisfactory disclosure.
Overall,  the level  of  information is  not  influenced by the quality  of  corporate governance:
specifically,  we noted that  firm-specific  expertise,  strictly  required in order to  identify  and
control the chain of significant estimates on which an impairment test is based, could be more
difficult to obtain for independent directors (Biondi et al., 2010).
However, it has to be added that the number of activity sectors considered in our study is
limited.  Future  research  could  usefully  investigate  the  impact  of  goodwill  impairment  and
accounting performance on corporate disclosure in a wider sample of firms, also extending the
time period of analysis. In any case, the findings of our study are consistent with the insights
of  earnings  management  theory,  suggesting  that  the  various  and  differing  profiles  of
subjectivity  inherent  in  impairment  test  assumptions  could  be  used  opportunistically  by
managers.
In this context, our results highlight the role of an adequate disclosure, especially in periods,
as our time, of strong market instability, which makes fair value measurements even more
difficult (Quagli, 2009). This also concerns the relevant assumptions inherent in the goodwill
impairment test as an indirect test based on potential upward valuations of reporting units and
their net assets (Ramanna & Watts, 2012).
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